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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/
Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Supreme Court No. 880299

vs .

Category 2

ONAN FORD,
Defendant/
Appellant.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a jury conviction of Aggravated
Robbery, a First Degree Felony, Utah Code Ann. 76-6-302
in the Second Judicial District Court.

(1975),

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(3)(i)
(1988) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether or not the trial court erred in denying

Defendant's pre-trial Motion to Quash the Line-Up.
2.

Whether or not the trial court erred in denying

Defendant's pre-trial Motion to Dismiss for Prosecutorial
Misconduct.
STATUTES, AND RULES
Statutes
Utah Code Ann. 76-6-302

(1975):

"(1) A person commits Aggravated Robbery if in the
course of committing a robbery he:
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(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm,
knife or a facsimile of a knife, or a deadly weapon; or
(b)

Causes serious bodily injury upon another.

(2) Aggravated Robbery is a felony of the first
degree .
(3) For the purpose of this part and act shall be
deemed to be 'in the course of committing a robbery1 if
it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the
attempt or commission of a robbery."
Rules
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4.2.
with Person Represented by Counsel:

Communication

"In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject of the representation
with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to
do so."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant ONAN FORD was charged by Information with
Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. 76-6-302 (1975) (R. 1 ) .
Defendant was initially arraigned in Circuit Court on
January 12, 1988, with Public Defendant Robert L. Froerer
representing him as counsel (R. 3 ) . Defendant's preliminary
hearing was held on January 21, 1988, and Defendant was bound
over to District Court for arraignment.

On January 29, 1988,

Stephen Laker, Public Defender, standing in for Robert L.
Froerer, appeared with Defendant at his arraignment in District
Court.

The arraignment was continued for one week to February 5,
-5-

1988, at which time Merlin Calver, an attorney hired by
Defendant, appeared as counsel for Defendant, and Defendant's
Not Guilty plea was entered.

The Defendant, through Mr. Calver,

then filed several pre-trial Motions, among them a Motion to
Dismiss (R. 57) accompanied by a Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss (R. 221) and
Attorney's Affidavit in Support (R. 53) and Defendant's Affidavit
in Support (R. 62). Defendant also filed a Motion to Quash
Lineup (R. 19) and Memorandum in Support (R. 20) .
Mr. Calver subsequently withdrew as counsel for
Defendant on April 21, 1988 (R. 97). On April 22, 1988, a
hearing was held to obtain a new trial setting and for a report
on Defendant's new counsel.

This hearing was continued to April

29, 1988, on Defendant's request to obtain private counsel (R.
89).

On April 29, 1988, Robert L. Froerer of the Weber County

Public Defender Association entered as counsel for Defendant, and
the trial date of June 7, 1988, was set (R. 93).
Defendant, through Attorney Robert L. Froerer, then
filed two additional Motions, one of which was to recuse the
Weber County Attorney's office and appoint a special prosector
(R. 128) along with a Memorandum in support of such Motion (R.
123).

A hearing on Defendant's pre-trial Motions was held on

June 7 and 8, 1988 (R. 130-134, 748, 787, 858), in which all of
Defendant's pre-trial Motions were denied.
Defendant was convicted in a trial by jury held on June
29 and 30, 1988, in the Second Judicial District Court, the
-6-

Honorable David E. Roth presiding

(R. 245). On June 30, 1988,

Judge Roth sentenced Defendant to the Utah State Prison for a
term not less than five years and which may be for life (R. 283)•

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Section One
On January 11, 1988, at approximately 6:00 p.m., a
black male entered a business called Gas-N-Go (R. 321-322).

Mr.

Garcia, a clerk at Gas-N-Go, described the black male as about
five feet five inches, wearing a green jacket, a red scarf, and a
gray hat.

The scarf was covering half his face, and he had

light brown pants on and was wearing white tennis shoes (R.
323).

The gray hat was a pullover hat, covering his ears and

leaving just a little bit of hair showing

(R. 324). This same

black male brought up to the counter a box of Reynolds Wrap (R.
325-327), which was still on the counter after he left (R. 332),
and pulled out a small handgun, pointing it toward an employee of
the business, John Garcia, and asked Mr. Garcia to give him all
the money he had (R. 327).

In opening the cash register, Mr.

Garcia activated an alarm (R. 329). After taking money from the
till, the suspect allegedly turned and left the store toward the
east on Patterson Avenue (R. 331)•
Officer Hugh Miller of the Ogden City Police Department
followed footprints which he suspected were those of the suspect
in the robbery and followed them to a residence located at 3237
Jefferson Avenue, Ogden, Utah (R. 362-367).
-7-

At such residence,

he obtained information from some juveniles that their parents
and two other adults had left in a blue vehicle (R. 367 and 368).
Subsequently, a vehicle was stopped near the residence at 3237
Jefferson by Officer Stewart (R. 370 and 396). The Defendant was
removed from the vehicle, and it was determined that his shoes
matched the footprints observed in the snow (R. 396).
Defendant was transported to the police department (R.
397), and while there, Defendant was required to participate in a
lineup, which was called a "show-up" by police officers (R. 336,
375).

The lineup in which the Defendant participated was made up

of only three suspects (R. 374). After the Defendant was
identified by Mr. Garcia from the Gas-N-Go business (R. 336 and
374), the three suspects in the lineup were also asked to speak
for purposes of making a voice identification (R. 337 and 375).
Defendant was subsequently booked for Aggravated Robbery (R.
377) .
Section Two
A hearing was held on June 8, 1988,

on Defendant's

Motion to Quash a Lineup in which he had been identified as the
perpetrator of the Aggravated Robbery occurring at the Gas~N-Go
business (R. 336, 375).

Prior to and during the lineup

procedure, Defendant made several requests to have his attorney
present (R. 788, 790, 791, 793, and 805). All of Defendant's
requests were denied (R., 788-790).

The Defendant testified that

he was placed in a room with two other males (R. 789) for
purposes of allowing the witness to attempt to identify the
-8-

perpetrator of the Aggravated Robbery.

One of the other lineup

suspects testified that he was asked to be in a lineup; not a
show-up, but a lineup (R. 804).
Though there were three people involved as suspects in
this identification process, at least one of them was
signficantly different in appearance from the Defendant, being
described as a lighter fellow, yellow-skinned, short, with an
Afro (R. 802, 806).
Police Officer Spence Phillips, the shift manager at
time, who was also in charge of the lineup procedure, testified
that the procdure he called a show-up highly resembled a lineup
procedure (R. 828). He further testified that the procedure was
not tape recorded, that no photographs were taken, and that none
of the suspects had an attorney present (R. 828). When asked
whether or not the case would have been prejudiced by allowing
additional time for tape recording, photographing, and getting an
attorney for the Defendant, Officer Phillips agreed that no harm
would have occurred

(R. 829).

However, because the police had a

lot of calls that evening, Officer Phillips stated, "...I was
trying to get this thing over so I could get officers back on the
air."

(R. 829). The officer further stated that a tape recorder

was unavailable, but that one could have been obtained within a
half hour to an hour's time (R. 829, 830).
Section Three
Regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, based on
prosecutorial misconduct, the facts are as follows:
-9-

In February of 1988/ Defendant retained Merlin Calver
to represent him in the charges involved in this case (h\

h45J .

Prior to retaining Mr, Calver as private counsel, Defendant was
represented by an attorney from the Weber County Public Defenders
Association.
Sometime after the Defendant retained Mr. Calver,
Officer Norman Soakai of the Ogden City Police Department was
contacted by Defendant from the jail (R. 547, 548).

Defendant

and Detective Soakai discussed the possibilities of trading
information Defendant had learned while in jail about another
case in exchange for a deal on his own case (R. 552, 553). The
Defendant requested that, in exchange for his information he be
placed in a county jail or halfway house as opposed to prison (R.
554) .
Detective Soakai and Detective Lucas then commenced
communications between the Defendant and attorneys in the Weber
County Attorney's office:

Reed Richards, County Attorney, and

Gary Heward, Deputy County Attorney, with the detectives acting
as message carriers (R. 555-557, 559, 694-695).
Through negotiations with the prosecutor and without
counsel, Defendant understood that, in exchange for giving
information about the Jeff Scott case, he would be placed in a
halfway house (R. 716-717, 732). The County Attorney, Reed
Richards, Deputy County Attorney, Gary Heward, and police
detectives met with the Defendant in the jail to present the
State's written offer to the Defendant (R. 601, 665-666) (see
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Addendum, Exhibit 1 ) . However, Defendant did not fully
understand it (R. 650, 718, 721) and didn't even completely read
it, for as he stated, "I heard what I wanted to hear.
can arrange for you to go to a halfway house."

Yes, we

(R. 736).

During this meeting, Defendant was asked by Mr. Heward if he was
going to plead guilty, to which inquiry Defendant responded, "No"
(R. 742). At some point in time, Defendant asked if he shouldn't
review the matter with his attorney, Mr. Calver , but he was
specifically instructed by the detectives not to call Mr. Calver
until "all this is over with."

(R. 176-177, 191).

At some point in time, Defendant gave Detective Lucas a
statement of what he knew concerning the Jeff Scott case
(Addendum, Exhibit 2 ) . Defendant stated in his taped statement,
"I'm hoping that the county attorney will read it...and work
some kind of deal with me" (Defendant's last answer, Addendum,
Exhibit 2 ) .
Shortly thereafter, a body transmitter was placed on
Defendant (R. 612) to monitor a conversation between Defendant
and Jeff Scott's attorney, Randine Salerno.

The idea to monitor

the conversation was derived by the detectives and approved by
the Weber County Attorney "to see if she would accept more
diamonds in the jail" (R. 594-595).
Attorney Salerno's office was contacted by another
Ogden City Detective, Detective Chesser, who left a message with
Ms. Salerno's secretary that Mr. Ford was in need of legal
services and requested her presence as soon as possible (R. 614
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and 620).

Shortly thereafter, Ms. Salerno arrived at the jail,

and a discussion then ensued between her and Defendant in a way
that it appeared that Mr. Ford was attempting to hire Ms.
Salerno.

They discussed facts of his case in great detail,

incriminating statements were made by the Defendant, and costs
for representation were discussed (R. 621-622, 626-628) .

The

entire conversation was taped and monitored by detectives from
the Ogden City Police Department (R. 607, 622).

Kristine

Knowlton, an attorney from the Weber County Attorney1s Office,
then listened to the tape (R. 707), and the County Attorney
himself listened to a portion of the tape (R. 705) and may have
been privy to a great deal of information contained therein.
Two attorneys who had dealt with Mr. Ford during the
events that transpired testified that Mr. Ford had difficulty
understanding things at times and may have had a learning
disability, and took a lot of time to think about questions and
responding to them (R. 633-634, 640, 653-654) .
After learning what had transpired without his
knowledge, Defendant's attorney of choice, Merlin Calver, filed a
complaint with the State Bar Association against Mr. Heward and
Mrs. Richards, the Weber County prosecutors involved in this case
(R. 645) (see Addendum, Exhibit 3 ) . Mr. Calver subsequently
withdrew from the Defendant's case due to the fact that he felt
he had become ineffective counsel for Defendant for the following
reasons:

(1) he was feeling extremely uncomfortable due to the

fact that the two prosecutors in the case were friends of his,
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(2) he was having problems in getting discovery and getting the
case positioned properly, due to his complaint to the bar (R.
645), and (3) he felt he might be a witness in the case and would
not, therefore, be able to act as counsel (R. 645-647).
Mr. Calver testified that, in his experience as a
defense attorney, that the plea negotiation offered to Defendant
was not as advantageous as he may have been able to have obtained
with the help of an attorney, and that he could not negotiate
effectively in the position he had been placed in by the
circumstances (R, 648, 650-651).

Mr. Calver further testified

that, as an experienced defense attorney, it was his opinion that
Mr. Ford was denied his right to have an attorney when he was
asked to sign a certain document by police officers (R. 656), and
that the taped conversation made of the conversation between
Defendant and Attorney Salerno listened to by police and
prosecutors did, in fact, contain many statements that were
incriminatory and against the Defendants interest (R. 659).
Even after the Defendant learned from his attorney,
Mr, Calver, that the deal was not what Defendant thought it was,
he still testified as a witness for the State in the Jeff Scott
matter, due to the fact that he felt that he had to or the State
would file criminal charges against his girl friend, Robin, for
receiving stolen property (R. 722, 732).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Defendant contends that the lower Court erred in
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denying his pre-trial Motions (1) to quash the lineup and (2) to
dismiss based on prosecutorial misconduct resulting in
Defendant's receiving ineffective assistance of counsel.
ARGUMENT
Point One
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
QUASH THE LINEUP*
Utah Code Ann. §77-8-2 provides that "a suspect has the
right to have an attorney present at any lineup" and further,
"that every suspect that is unable to employ counsel shall be
entitled to representation by an attorney appointed by a
magistrate for a lineup, either before or after an arrest"
[emphasis added].
There are further requirements dealing with lineups
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-8-4 as follows:

"The entire

procedure shall be recorded, including all conversations between
the witnesses and the conducting peace officers.

The suspect

shall have access to and may make copies of the record and any
photographs taken of him or any other person in connection with
the lineup."
In the case before us, the Defendant, ONAN FORD, was,
indeed, subjected to a lineup.

He was placed in a room with two

other people, ordered to stand and turn at various angles, and
make a statement (R. 826) so that the witness, John Garcia, could
attempt to identify the suspect in an alleged robbery which had
occurred previously that night.

Prior to being subjected to the
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lineup, the Defendant made several requests for representation of
an attorney (R. 788, 790, 791, 793, 805) and such requests should
immediately have been granted.

The State should not have gone

forward with the lineup prior to counsel being present.
The State argues that there is a distinction between a
"show-up" and a "lineup," and that this was a showup, which does
not require as many safeguards for a suspect.

However, ample

evidence exists indicating that what Defendant was subjected to
was a lineup (R. 828). The Defendant was in the custody of the
police at the police station; the Defendant was placed in a room
with other individuals; the witness was brought to the police
station for identification of the suspect; the witness was not
injured nor harmed in any way; the witness was in the presence of
a police officer; Defendant was requested to make statements that
may have been incriminating for purposes of voice identification;
there was no recording of the proceedings nor photographs taken;
there were no apparent exigent circumstances requiring an
immediate lineup, nor was there any foreseeable reason the
Defendant's statutory and constitutional right to an attorney
could not have been upheld (R. 828) .
The State has violated the Rules of Utah Criminal
Procedure pertaining to the proper conducting of lineups and the
Defendant's right to have counsel present at a lineup, even
before an arrest (U.C.A. §77-8-2) [emphasis added].

Even the

officer in charge of the lineup stated that no harm to the
State's case would have resulted by delaying long enough to get
-15-

an attorney for Defendant (R. 829) .
In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 18 L.Ed.2d
1149, 87 Supreme Ct 1926 (1967) , the Supreme Court held that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires that absent an
intelligent waiver, both an accused and his counsel be notified
of an impending police lineup and counsel be present at the
lineup where the lineup is a critical stage of the prosecution.
Although the Wade case dealt with a post-indictment lineup, the
requirements contained in this case should apply when there is no
showing of immediate prejudice occurring by granting a suspect
additional time in which to have counsel present and safeguard
the reliability of the proceedings, particularly in light of the
statutory right of a suspect to have counsel present at a lineup
before an arrest, Utah Code Ann. 77-8-2 [emphasis added].
Because Defendant's rights while a suspect in a lineup
have been seriously violated, this case should be reversed and
remanded for a new trial.

An order should also 'be made

suppressing all tainted evidence.
Point Two
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS DUE TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
...In conducting a trial, a prosecutor is bound only
by the general rules of law and professional ethics that bind all
counsel."

63 AmJr. 2d, Prosecuting Attorneys, §3.
"A district attorney or his associate may not

communicate with a defendant who is represented by counsel, even
though the defendant has approached the district attorney..,
-16-

ff

Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct, N. Carolina Bar Opinion
30, April 16, 1987.
"A state prosecutor may not communicate with a
defendant without the knowledge and consent of the defendant's
lawyer, even though the defendant has requested the interview."
Supra, Tenn. Opinion 87-F-112, Sept. 28, 1987.
Defendant's conviction should be reversed solely on the
basis that the Weber County Attorney's Office violated the
Professional Rules of Conduct, Rule 4.2 (see supra).
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall...have the assistance of counsel for his defense."

The

United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Morrison, 449
U.S. 361, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981), discusses the effect of
prosecution interference with the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel of a defendant.

The Morrison case states that a showing

of demonstrable prejudice is required in order to require
dismissal of the indictment.
569.

Morrison, 449 US 366, 66 L.Ed. 2d

In Mr. Ford's case, a demonstrable prejudice resulting

from the violation of Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel has indeed occurred.

It has been held that such

prejudice is present when, among other things, government action
destroys defendant's confidence in his attorney and when the
prosecution takes other actions designed to give it unfair
advantage.

See U.S. v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182.
In Mr. Ford's case, the prosecution and police actions
-17-

have denied the Defendant his right to counsel in negotiating a
plea bargain (or sentencing concession), by their contact with
Defendant alone.

Defendant was prejudiced, in that substantial

information was obtained from Defendant about Defendant's own
case, when Defendant, without the advice of counsel, participated
in the attempted sting operation which was conducted by the
police and approved by the County Attorney (R. 594-595) against
attorney Randine Salerno.
Defendant's case was further prejudiced and counsel
rendered ineffective by the fact that Defendant's counsel, Merlin
Calver, reported the conduct of the Weber County Attorney's
Office to the Utah State Bar Association (R. 647) (Addendum,
Exhibit 3 ) . By filing such complaint there developed prejudcie
or presumed prejudice on the part of the County Attorney's Office
against this Defendant's attorney and, therefor, arguably against
this Defendant, in that communication and cooperation between
defense counsel and the County Attorney's Office had broken down
(R. 651). Based upon this breakdown of communication, the
Defendant was denied his right to effective counsel, perhaps
permanently, no matter which attorney was to handle the case.
Due to Mr. Calver's ineffectiveness, he withdrew from the matter
(R. 97) and therefore Defendant's trial date was delayed, all
because of the County Attorney's Office's failure to honor
Defendant's right to counsel.
In an earlier case, the Washington State Supreme Court
held that Defendant has a constitutional right to have counsel
-18-

present during the course of plea negotiation, State v. Johnson,
596 P.2d 308 (Wash., 1979).

In the Johnson case there were

negotiations which were found to have taken place outside the
scope of Defendant's counsel's involvement, which the Washington
Supreme Court found to be a direct violation of the Defendant's
constitutional right to have counsel present at all crucial
stages of the criminal proceeding.

The Washington Supreme Court

has also held that the defendant is entitled to counsel in plea
negotiations and in the plea process under the Sixth Amendment
and Article I, Section 22, of the Washington State Constitution.
See State v. Wendon, 607 P.2d 852 (Wash., 1980).
In Defendant's case, there were negotiations for
sentencing concessions between police officers and the Weber
County Attorney's Office directly with the Defendant, ONAN FORD
(R. 555-557, 559, 601, 665-666, 694-695, 716-717, 732, 742).

In

the Michigan case of People v. Green, 174 N.W.2d 448 (Michigan,
1979), the Michigan Court held that, "Where proscecuting attorney
accompanied police and detective on visit with defendant at jail
and asked accused if he was telling the truth, after defendant,
in response to questions propounded mainly by detective,
proceeded to tell exculpatory story, prosecuting attorney
violated disciplinary rules prohibiting direct communication with
adverse party, despite the fact that the defendant requested the
visit and waived his right to have his attorney present."

See

also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971),
in which plea bargaining has been recognized as an essential
-19-

component of the administration of justice.
The actions of the law enforcement officials and
prosecutorfs office constitute a blatant disregard for
Defendant's rights pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution guaranteeing the right of defendant to
effective assistance of counsel.
Because in this case on this issue actions by the
prosecutors and their agents effectively removed the possibility
of Defendant having effective assistance of counsel, this case
should be reversed and dismissed.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing issues and arguments, and a
thorough review of the evidence and law pertaining thereto,
Defendant respectfully requests a reversal of his conviction or,
in the alternative, remanded for a new trial with suppression of
evidence as required.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /3

day of February, 1989.
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